Too little, too late is not a policy choice.
We expect the Federal Reserve to hold its overnight policy rate within the current range of 3.75% to 4.0% at the Wednesday meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee.
That policy decision will be accompanied by at least two dissents, from Cleveland Fed President Beth Hammack and Dallas Fed President Lorie Logan, in favor of a rate hike, with a possible third from Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari.
We expect no significant change to the Fed policy statement and a short press conference in which Fed Chair Kevin Warsh will limit opportunities for a verbal misstep.
Get Joe Brusuelas’s Market Minute commentary every morning. Subscribe now.
The meeting comes after a period in which four Fed members—Michelle Bowman, Philip Jefferson, Christopher Waller and John Williams—all suggested that the Fed had time to act, only to be caught on the wrong side of ugly consumer and producer inflation data for September.
Indeed, there are signs that inflation is gaining steam. On Thursday, the personal consumption expenditures index for September will be released and we expect a 0.5% monthly increase on tap less than 24 hours after the October policy decision in published.
The Fed meeting comes at a time that, if not for the midterm elections on Nov. 3, we would have expected another rate increase of 25 or even 50 basis points in an effort to restore price stability.
Private nonresidential investment is running hot, the labor market stands at full employment and yet many households find it a challenge to purchase food for their family, gasoline for their autos or refill their fuel oil tanks as winter approaches.
It is as if the hardships imposed by rising inflation were affecting households and profit margins on a different planet.
We expect that if the Fed holds rates steady, Warsh will face aggressive questioning on why the FOMC chose to hike at its September meeting following a strong inflation print in August but not in October following an acceleration in September.
The Fed chair does not favor forward guidance. But if he obfuscates on the decision to hold rates steady, capital markets professionals will most likely conclude that the decision is based on something other than the Fed’s dual mandate of price stability and maximum sustainable employment.
After more than five years of elevated inflation, investors are already pricing in greater risk in money market and bond market securities.
Long-term interest rates have spiked because of the strains of simultaneously funding the AI buildout and rising government debt.
And the increased cost of issuing long-term debt has the Treasury overloading the front-end of the yield curve with T-bill auctions, pressuring the credit markets that finance day-to-day business operations.
There is enough history to think that the Fed knows that this approach cannot be sustained.
So why not raise rates now?
The Fed has a time-tested framework for decision making, having replaced its helter-skelter policies of the postwar era with the structure provided by its 2% inflation-targeting policy.
The inflation-targeting scorecard
The record of inflation targeting speaks for itself, with the all-too-frequent exceptions a result of shocks set off by the Iran war, supply-chain distortions and fiscal-policy choices, all of which are beyond the Fed’s purview.
To reduce the risk of inflation causing suboptimal growth, central banks have long operated under inflation-targeting policies within a range centered on 2%.
The Federal Reserve adopted an implicit 2% target in the mid-1990s under its chairman at the time, Alan Greenspan, before moving to an explicit target in 2012 under Ben Bernanke.
In 2020, the Fed adopted a soft target, allowing inflation to move modestly above 2% to counter disinflation and sluggish growth.
During the entire inflation-targeting era, PCE inflation, the Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, has been 2% or less in half of the 369 months from January 1996 through August 2026.
That of course means that in half of the months, inflation has been higher than the 2% target and higher than 3% in 16% of those months. With inflation now at 3.4% and expected to hit 3.6% in September, this is an anomaly that needs to be addressed.
Inflation-targeting in the post-pandemic era
The Fed’s soft targeting of inflation as the economy recovered from the pandemic was a sensible way to counter the hollowing out of U.S. production centers and the labor-market distortions caused by the flood of cheap goods from China.
Recall that the Fed’s dual mandate is for price stability and full employment.
In addition, ultra-low interest rates created an incentive for businesses to invest in productivity-enhancing software, equipment and intellectual property.
These investments fostered the automation of tasks that were impossible to fill during the pandemic and then afterward when the labor force continued to shrink as immigration plummeted and retirements increased.
But there were three factors that were beyond the Fed’s control, which would push inflation higher and keep it there:
- The shutting down of international supply chains. Once they reopened they could not meet global aggregate demand fueled by post-pandemic spending.
- Tariff shocks of 2025 and the subsequent supply chain shock.
- The energy shocks caused by the wars in Ukraine and Iran.
As of August, PCE inflation has been above 2% for 67 straight months. That is more than five and a half years of inflation eating into workers’ earnings.
Why is it taking so long for the Fed to act?
Reasons not to act in 2025, but to act in 2026.
Inflation had dropped to 2.5% by March 2025, and the midpoint in the federal funds rate at 4.375% was well above the Fed’s then terminal rate of 3%.
As the year progressed, markets brushed aside the impact of tariffs amid expectations that the Fed would continue to reduce its overnight rates throughout 2025.
That optimism lasted until the spring, when the energy shock hit.
This year, the “gasoline and other motor fuel” component of PCE inflation spiked as high as 40%, fueling inflation.
This is when the Fed should have acted decisively.
Look at the multiple episodes of spikes in oil prices and coincidental spikes in inflation for proof of the relationship among energy, inflation, economic decelerations and outright recessions.
The prime example would be the repercussions of the 1970s oil embargoes that resulted in a surge in inflation and the 1980s double-dip recessions.
The takeaway
The Fed will keep its policy rate on hold even though inflation looks to be accelerating.
In addition, the off-the-chart increases in the cost of fuel are unlikely to disappear overnight, suggesting further inflation and financial market distress before any increase in the Fed’s overnight rate can begin to quell inflation.
In addition, real time data shows that oil pricing pressures are increasing, which will push inflation higher and support a rate hike in December.
Should the conflict in the Middle East intensify after the elections, inflationary pressures will rise which could prompt the Fed to raise its rate by 50 basis points in December.
Such an outsized increase would in retrospect not shine a positive light on the choice not to act in October.





